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Introduction
The capabilities afforded by network technologies have resulted in numerous electronic commerce applications. But major
issues remain which pose serious challenges to the growth and wide adoption of electronic commerce, one being the much talked
about security concerns on the Internet (Bhimani 1996 and Froomkin 1996). Proponents of electronic commerce argue that
security is a technology issue and has been addressed by various technology developments, such as cryptography, firewalls, and
digital certificates, which is true to a certain extent. There is, however, another challenge that has not received as much attention
in either the popular press or the research community - the quality uncertainty problem that could result in the public’s mistrust
in products and services offered online (Choi et al. 1997). Being more of a social and economic issue than a technology
challenge, the quality uncertainty problem can severely cripple the development of electronic commerce. How can people
promote the trust necessary for efficient online exchange of products and services when individuals have short run temptations
to cheat?
Unfortunately, the legal system has not yet caught up with the pace in which electronic commerce is growing. In the absence
of a legal system that enforces rules and proper conducts in the electronic marketplace, institutions such as certification
authorities (CA) have emerged in recent years. They act as trusted third parties to authenticate individuals and business entities,
by attesting to some fact about a digital certificate holder. Most research work done so far on certification authorities focuses
on the technology aspect and investigates what technology infrastructure is needed for such trusted third parties to work
(Froomkin 1996, McConnell and Appel 1996, Biddle 1997). They fail to address the quality uncertainty problem in electronic
transactions. An online vendor who has been authenticated as who he claims he is (i.e., he holds a valid digital certificate) can
still cheat consumers by selling counterfeit products or products that do not match up the promised quality.
We propose a new design of trusted third parties that builds on the current structure of CAs. By using a game theoretic
approach, we illustrate how extralegal institutions such as trusted third parties can help achieve a proper order for doing business
online.

Product Quality in Electronic Transactions
The online market offers abundant amount of product information for consumers. However, under the disguise of
information overflow, there is also information scarcity, a phenomenon that affects the market efficiency by creating information
asymmetry (Akerlof 1970). In many situations, information asymmetry has significant implications on the operations of markets
(Jensen and Meckling 1976, Caillaud 1990, Greenwald, 1990) and creates the product quality uncertainty problem. Due to the
existence of asymmetric information, it is difficult for buyers in the electronic market to have a full knowledge of the product
quality or vendor reputation prior to purchase. Legal or non-legal protections are needed to protect the interests of the electronic
market players and facilitate the market efficiency.
Research in the law community has argued that in situations where legal mechanisms are not complete, extralegal
mechanisms such as informal social norms or non-legal institutions can also help people interact to their mutual advantage
(Macaulay 1963, Reid 1980, Ellickson 1991, Bernstein 1992). These norms identify the everyday behaviors that call for the
informal administration of rewards and punishments.
Certification authorities (CA) such as Visa or VeriSign emerged in recent years attempting to provide a secure transaction
environment. However, what is available from the current structure of CAs is not enough to solve the product quality problem.
An authenticated vendor can still cheat a consumer by selling counterfeit products. Additional rules are needed for CAs to
function properly for market efficiency. In the following section we specify economic designs that a trusted third party should
adopt to be an effective extralegal institution for enforcing honest behavior in the online market.

Trusted Third Parties as the Enforcement System
Suppose that a seller and a buyer are engaged in an online exchange. Each of them can choose to play either Honest or
Cheat. Table 1 presents the payoff structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where A > B > C > D . This gives both sides
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an incentive to cheat (Axelrod 1980, Milgrom et al 1990), even though honest behavior maximizes the total payoff of the two
players: 2 B > A + D .
Obviously, if this transaction is conducted only once, it is to each player’s separate advantage to play Cheat, since that play
yields a higher payoff regardless of what the other player does. It is, however, worth noting that both players are worse off than
if they could somehow agree to play honest because the payoff of both playing honest is B while the payoff is only C if both
plays cheat.
In the global online market, a cheater could cheat thousands of times without
Table 1.
ever facing the cheated a second time. Each individual transaction thus becomes
Buyer
a Prisoner’s Dilemma game where it is never to the player’s advantage to be
Honest
Cheat
honest. We propose the design of an institution, a trusted third party (TTP), that
-----------------------------------------------------can help re-enforce honest trading by changing the nature of the transaction to a
Honest B , B
D, A
long term game in which each player’s reputation is tied to every single
Seller
transaction. The TTP is built on the current models of certification authorities
C, C
Cheat
A, D
(CA) but has enriched functionality. The digital certificate issued by the CAs
-----------------------------------------------------serve not only as an authentication tool, but also as a reputation indicator. Any
one who holds a valid digital certificate should be regarded as a reputable player.
If an online vendor sells fake products or products that are of a less quality than have been represented, unless the vendor paid
off all the fines awarded to the cheated parties by the CA, the vendor’s digital certificate will be revoked by the issuing CA. This
will be an indication to any prospective buyers that this vendor doesn’t behave honestly.
Now we formalize the online transaction process to illustrate the TTP’s role by structuring the events with the following
sequence of play:
1. Before any player is engaged in online transactions, he should apply to TTP for a digital certificate.
2. When players begin to do transaction, they ask each other to provide their digital certificate issued by a TTP. Each player
then verifies with the TTP the validity of the certificate, at no utility cost.
3. The two players play the Prisoners’ Dilemma game and learn the outcome.
4. Either may appeal to the TTP at personal cost K > 0, but only if he has checked his partner’s digital certificate with the TTP.
5. If either party makes an appeal, then the TTP investigates and awards a judgment, J, to the plaintiff if he has been Honest
and his trading partner has cheated; otherwise, no award is made.
6. If a judgment J is awarded, the defendant may pay it, at cost f (J), or he may refuse to pay, at cost zero. The function
f : ℜ + → ℜ + represents the utility cost of paying a given judgment and is increasing and continuous. In addition,

f ( x ) ≥ x , that is, what the cheater ends up paying is more than what the TTP awards to the plaintiff
7.

Any unpaid judgments result in the revocation of the cheating player’s certificate by the TTP.
The desired behavior of the players in various contingencies under the TTP system is described in the following TTP System
Strategy (TTPSS).
a. At substage 1, a player verifies a digital certificate with the TTP if he himself has a digital certificate, but not otherwise.
b. At substage 2, if either player does not have a digital certificate or if either player has failed to verify the digital certificate,
then both players play Cheat (which we may interpret as a refusal by the honest trader to trade); otherwise, both play Honest.
c. At substage 3, if both players verified the digital certificates at substage 1 and exactly one of the two players Cheated at
substage 2, then the victim appeals to the TTP.
d. At substage 4, if a valid appeal was filed, the TTP awards damages of J to the cheated party.
e. At substage 5, the defendant pays the judgment J if and only if he has a valid digital certificate.
Theorem. The Trusted Third Party System Strategy is a symmetric sequential equilibrium strategy of the electronic market
transaction game if and only if the following inequality holds.

(δ B − C ) /(1 − δ ) ≥ f ( J ) ≥ max[( A − B ), f ( K )]

If this condition is satisfied, then the average payoff per period for each player (at the equilibrium) is B.
The above steps spell out the design of the trusted third party that would provide protection to consumers and vendors alike,
in the absence of legal enforcement. That is, if the inequality holds, no players with the TTP in the electronic market would find
it advantageous to cheat.

Limitations and Conclusion
In section 3 we have spelled out the design of a trusted third party that would provide protection to online traders. However,
we do realize that our analysis is based on the assumption that the TTP is a fair and honest judge who is able to make accurate
judgment. One can argue that TTPs have their own business interests and objectives. A TTP might be corrupt and solicit bribes
from players. Or they might accept voluntary bribes from players who have an unpaid judgment but wish to conceal that fact.
Consequently, we need a richer model that addresses the problem of dishonest third parties. Our preliminary analysis indicates
that we can find an equilibrium strategy where neither bribing is profitable for the traders nor accepting bribes profitable for the
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TTP. Of course, as we add richness to the possibilities for cheating, the functions and strategies of the TTP will have to respond
in a correspondingly rich way.
In closing, by introducing a trusted third party that not only issues digital certificate, but also punishes cheating behavior,
players can obtain information regarding a trading partner’s past history, by verifying whether the partner has a valid digital
certificate. In this model, rather than being simply an authentication tool, a digital certificate actually represents a player’s
reputation. Therefore, even though obtaining complete information about a trading partner is almost impossible in the global
online market, the trust third party presents an effective alternative in filling the gap.
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